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Articles
SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR TAX REFORM
MICHAEL C. DURST*
I. INTRODUCTION
THIS Article is written at a time when the U.S. political process seemslargely stalled as a result of fundamental disagreements concerning
the desired role of government in national economic affairs, and hence
the desired level of tax revenues.  The stalemate has slowed, at best to a
crawl, legislative movement toward comprehensive tax reform.  This arti-
cle is intended to convey a modest collection of ideas that, it is hoped,
might be useful for consideration when the current legislative situation
becomes more fluid.  The article focuses most specifically on international
issues, but as discussed below, for a number of practical reasons such is-
sues cannot be addressed in isolation from broader questions of tax re-
form.  Therefore, this article essentially works outward from a discussion
of problems in the sphere of international taxation and suggests the kind
of overall reform in which currently vexing issues—not only in the interna-
tional field, but elsewhere—might be addressed in what is hoped can be
seen as a politically and economically moderate manner.
II. SOME INTERNATIONALLY FOCUSED OBSERVATIONS
I will start with a brief—and admittedly somewhat argumentative—
diagnostic review of the history of the rules that govern the international
taxation of U.S.-based companies.  Following the discussion of interna-
tional rules, I will expand the focus to a brief consideration of how the
different components of a reform—domestic as well as international—
might fit together in a comprehensive and coherent package.
I think that our current international tax rules are, to a large extent,
the result of historical accident.  Soon after World War II, with the devel-
opment of the new generation of wonder drugs by U.S. companies, phar-
maceutical companies began to transfer patent licenses to what came to be
known as “base companies” in low-tax countries.  By the early 1960s, the
Kennedy Administration thought that the revenue leakages from the use
of base companies were excessive, and the Administration sought to elimi-
nate the ability to shift income to low-tax jurisdictions.  Many saw this as a
* Mike Durst is a columnist for the publication Tax Notes.  This Article
summarizes remarks that Durst made at the Villanova Law Review Norman J.
Shachoy Symposium.  Portions of this Article are adapted from a column
published in Tax Notes on November 28, 2011, and are published here by
permission of Tax Analysts, Inc.
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move toward an economically unwise de facto tax increase on key U.S. busi-
nesses, and in any event the attempt to eliminate deferral proved politi-
cally infeasible.  Accordingly, starting with the Revenue Act of 1962 and
continuing over the course of the 1960s—with, of course, many modifica-
tions since the 1960s—Congress and the Treasury developed a system of
rules that continued to allow deferral through income shifting, but sought
to limit income shifting to some extent.
Then, as new intangibles-intensive industries, such as the electronics
and later software industries, developed alongside the pharmaceutical in-
dustry, and as tax practitioners developed greater expertise in working
with the applicable rules—with the controlled foreign corporation rules of
subpart F and the transfer pricing rules—the practice of income shifting
to low- and zero-tax countries grew.  The introduction in the 1990s of the
check the box rules, and of today’s cost sharing rules, accelerated the ex-
pansion of income shifting.  I think it is fair to say that today, the extent of
income shifting by U.S.-based companies, to low- and zero-tax countries,
extends far beyond what Congress and the Treasury could have envisioned
during the 1960s.
I believe as well—and I know some may in all sincerity disagree—that
the expansion of income shifting reflects some basic failures of policy-mak-
ers in the 1960s to foresee some of the substantive implications of the
system they were creating.  First, I think that the policy-makers of the
1960s didn’t foresee that the courts would hold that the Treasury does not
have the power to tax the transfer by a U.S. company of the right to con-
duct a potentially profitable business outside the United States.  That is, I
don’t think it was foreseen, in the 1960s, that the transfer of a so-called
“business opportunity” would be outside the reach of the transfer pricing
rules.
When a U.S. company gives a subsidiary the right to try to replicate a
proven business model overseas, the parent company has an expectation
that the subsidiary probably will succeed in its efforts—that is, the ex-
pected return at the time of the transfer is positive.  Yes, there is a chance
that the subsidiary’s efforts will fail, but the overall statistical expectation is
that the subsidiary’s efforts will succeed, and that the subsidiary will end
up generating profits.  If that expectation were not present, the company
would not make the transfer.
Because of the statistical expectation of success, companies would not
transfer business opportunities to unrelated companies without requiring
substantial compensation.  Our transfer pricing laws, however, do not re-
quire U.S. companies to receive arm’s length compensation when they
transfer business opportunities to related companies.  The result is that
our transfer pricing laws permit the tax-free transfer of huge amounts of
income-generating potential overseas, without a requirement that arm’s
length consideration be paid.
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I think, in addition, that the architects of our international corporate
tax system failed to appreciate the consequences of permitting the sourc-
ing of business income to be determined by the terms of contracts, includ-
ing both contracts for the license of intangibles and other contracts that
allocate risks and rights to income, that are made between members of
commonly controlled groups.  The related companies that are party to
such contracts all have precisely the same owners—precisely the same ulti-
mate shareholders.  These contracts therefore involve no genuine adverse
bargaining and do not apportion risks and rewards in any real economic
sense.  Market forces impose no discipline on the terms of such contracts;
instead, the parties are free to draft such contracts with the sole objective
of moving anticipated income to the lowest-tax jurisdiction.  Not surpris-
ingly, permitting taxpayers to rely on intragroup contracts for tax pur-
poses has amounted to an open-ended invitation to shift income to low-
and zero-tax countries.
I have listed only two central errors that I think policy-makers made in
the 1960s, and which have been perpetuated until the present time.  More
could, I think, be said along these lines, but I am not sure that offering a
more detailed bill of particulars right now would be useful.
So I will move on to the question of whether the income shifting
which currently occurs inflicts damage that should be redressed as part of
tax reform.  Again, opinions may differ, but I am personally convinced
that the shifting of income under our current tax rules has serious adverse
consequences for the United States.
First, it seems apparent to me that the current rules—particularly by
allowing the tax-free transfer of business opportunities from the United
States—have drained off a large chunk of our corporate tax base.  This
erosion of the tax base has, I believe, led to chronic shortfalls in revenue
collections from the corporate income tax.  These shortfalls have in turn
contributed to the maintenance of a statutory corporate rate that is much
higher than is consistent with adequate levels of corporate investment and
employment in the United States.  Every tenth of a percentage point in
the corporate tax rate directly reduces the expected after tax rate of re-
turn from business investment.  No other component of the tax system so
directly and predictably diminishes incentives for business investment.  By
tending to push corporate tax rates higher, income shifting discourages
investment and employment in this country.
A second economic problem raised by income shifting does not di-
rectly involve transfers of property out of the United States, but neverthe-
less inflicts economic harm on this country.  Our current international
rules, particularly the rules of subpart F, make it easier for U.S. multina-
tionals to shift, to low- and zero-income countries, income that is earned
from manufacturing outside the United States than it is to shift income
from manufacturing inside the United States.  Ed Kleinbard explains this
3
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problem well in his recent writing.1  The relative ease of shifting foreign-
earned, but not U.S.-earned, manufacturing income to low- and zero-tax
countries creates an incentive for U.S.-based companies to shift their mix
of investment and employment away from the United States.
I am not in a position to know the quantitative significance of this
apparent bias toward non-U.S., as opposed to U.S., investment.  I am, fur-
ther, not sure that economic science is capable of measuring the effects of
this bias with any degree of confidence.  I will say, though, that in practice,
I have seen U.S. businesses choose to locate substantial operations over-
seas rather than here, predominantly for tax reasons.  I think this is unfor-
tunate and, indeed, unacceptable.
But the most serious harm from our current international tax rules, I
think, is not a tendency to erode the tax base, or to skew investment and
employment away from the United States.  The most serious harm is not
economic at all.  The income shifting that I have described is “perfectly
legal,” as the phrase goes, but the image that it presents to the public—an
image that has been made available to the public by leading journalists—
is, I think, deeply harmful.  The public sees our most important business
corporations, and policy-makers in Congress and elsewhere in Washing-
ton, colluding, albeit legally, to shift hundreds of billions of dollars of in-
come to mailbox companies in countries where the companies perform
little if any business activity.  Institutions in our society which should be
among the most worthy of respect appear to be engaged in a kind of be-
havior that typically would be associated with society’s least savory actors.
This spectacle cannot possibly be failing to contribute to what is already an
unhealthy erosion of public respect for governmental and business
institutions.
III. THE SHAPE OF COMPREHENSIVE REFORM?
I would like now to sketch out my own very incomplete thoughts
about where reform might be headed.  These thoughts are intended to
reflect what I think are two important principles: (i) that reform, if it is to
be effective, needs to involve many different parts of the tax system, not
just the corporate income tax; and (ii) that especially given our stressed
economy, we need to be mindful of the need to minimize disincentives for
investment and employment by U.S. businesses.
In particular, while I believe that the income shifting that is now ram-
pant among U.S. companies causes unacceptable damage to this country, I
also believe that income shifting opportunities should not be ended with-
out dramatically reducing the statutory corporate tax rate.  To eliminate
income shifting without substantially lowering the statutory rate would im-
pose a large additional tax burden increase on many important U.S.-based
1. See Edward D. Kleinbard, Stateless Income’s Challenge to Tax Policy, 132 TAX
NOTES 1021 (2011); Martin A. Sullivan, Economic Analysis: “Stateless Income” Is Key to
International Reform, 131 TAX NOTES 1315 (2011).
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corporations, including companies involved in valuable technological in-
novation.  I think this would be very inadvisable.2
The combination of international tax reform with a substantial corpo-
rate rate reduction, though, will plainly be a net revenue loser.  Responsi-
ble fiscal policy will, I believe, require us to make up that revenue, and
indeed generate additional revenues, from other components of the tax
system.  This is why we cannot reform our international tax system without
a comprehensive reform that extends beyond the corporate tax.
Now, in broad outline, what might a reformed system look like?  Well,
that’s a large question, and I cannot pretend to offer anything even close
to a comprehensive answer.  In various installments of the column that I
write for Tax Notes, I have tried to offer a broad list of features that a re-
formed system might include3—although I recognize that there are
counterarguments to each of the suggestions that I make.
Specifically, key components of my admittedly far from complete pic-
ture of reform include: (i) eliminating income shifting opportunities
through a revitalized subpart F, and also probably eliminating other provi-
sions that narrow the corporate tax base; (ii) dramatically reducing the
corporate tax rate—I have suggested a rate as low as 15 percent; (iii) the
recovery of revenue, and the generation of additional revenue for deficit
reduction, through increased rates and some curtailment of deductions
for the highest-bracket individual taxpayers; (iv) technical measures to
prevent the reduction of the corporate rate from inviting high-bracket in-
dividual taxpayers to use corporations as vehicles for tax deferral; and (v)
a “superdeduction” for employee compensation paid by businesses that
are operated as sole proprietorships or in passthrough form, since these
businesses will not benefit from a reduction in corporate rates but should,
I think, receive incentives for the creation of jobs.
I am aware that the goal of raising additional revenue through rate
increases on individual high-bracket taxpayers poses particular political
problems in the current environment.  It may well be preferable on some
grounds—both political and economic—to raise that revenue through a
value added tax (VAT) or another new consumption tax, rather than from
the individual income tax.  I believe, however, that attempts to institute a
2. The personal skepticism toward corporate income taxation as an institu-
tion, which this Article displays, reflects thirty years of work within the corporate
tax system during which the defects of the tax have become progressively more
evident.  For a comprehensive bill of particulars against the corporate income tax,
on economic as well as political grounds, see Yariv Brauner, The Non-Sense Tax: A
Reply to New Corporate Income Tax Advocacy, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 591.  Although I
do not, alas, consider it desirable, on fiscal grounds and other grounds, to elimi-
nate the corporate tax entirely, I believe that the economic case for minimizing it
is overwhelming.
3. Michael C. Durst, An Employment, Equity, and Competitiveness Tax Act, 132
TAX NOTES 1435 (2011); Michael C. Durst, Radical Centrism and the Corporate Income
Tax, 132 TAX NOTES 1059 (2011); Michael C. Durst Small Businesses, Passthroughs,
and Centrist Tax Reform, 133 TAX NOTES 247 (2011).
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new consumption tax are likely to be more problematic, politically, than
increased rates on high-income individuals.  Further, a new consumption
tax might be difficult to implement without adversely affecting the
progressivity of the tax system.  Moreover, my own admittedly approximate
computations suggest that high-bracket rate increases under the individual
tax can raise the additional revenues that are needed while still keeping
maximum rates very low by historical standards—that is, significantly less
than fifty percent.  I may be unduly pessimistic about the prospects for a
VAT or other consumption tax, and I may be overly optimistic about politi-
cal prospects for raising additional revenue from the individual income
tax.  The main point, though, is that effective corporate and international
tax reform will cost revenue, and that unavoidably, the lost revenue and
more will need to be recovered from other components of the tax system.
IV. SEEKING POLITICAL BALANCE
By coupling the elimination of international income shifting practices
with a dramatic decline in the corporate rate, my proposals combine ele-
ments that respond to traditional Republican Party concerns, and others
that respond to traditional Democratic Party concerns.  That mix is impor-
tant, since I do not think there is any route to comprehensive tax reform
that does not involve political tradeoff and political compromise of the
traditional kind.
Of course, the short list I have offered provides at best only the barest
framework for comprehensive reform.  Every item on the list poses signifi-
cant problems of feasibility and implementation, and every item on the list
is likely to be highly problematic to one or more political constituencies.
Building an effective reform package will involve a large amount of techni-
cal work, as well as political creativity in crafting trade-offs and
compromises.
And so we come back to the problem with which these remarks
started—namely that right now, the formal legislative process is unable to
make much progress toward solving the many problems, especially the
problem of political compromise—that comprehensive tax reform
presents.  Therefore, it is necessary for non-governmental experts, the
“government in exile,” to move the processes of technical refinement and
political compromise forward until the legislative environment opens up
once again.
V. TWO SUGGESTIONS
Given the complexity of the task ahead, are there any nuggets of ad-
vice that I might offer as finishing touches to this article—as, perhaps the
dessert course to the luncheon at which these thoughts originally were
presented?  Any such attempted nuggets will, of course, reflect my own
preconceptions, but with that caution in mind, let me offer two
suggestions.
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First, because I believe that effective tax reform will require a political
willingness to reduce the corporate rate, I think that successful reform will
require willingness among some constituencies, which historically have
supported relatively high levels of corporate taxation, to reconsider that
position.  High corporate tax rates are at least as inimical to the interests
of American labor as they are to the interests of corporate shareholders
and management.  I think that a vigorous but self-disciplined public de-
bate, showing the effects of high corporate tax rates on all sectors of our
population, could, perhaps more than any other single factor, help make
comprehensive tax reform feasible.
A second prerequisite to an effective tax policy debate is that those
who hold leadership roles within, and who advocate on behalf of, compa-
nies that today benefit from international income shifting opportunities,
and from other means of obtaining greatly reduced effective corporate tax
rates, refrain from the posture that the status quo is the only acceptable
outcome of debate over comprehensive tax reform.  Yes, there are many
reasons why promoting the status quo might appear to be in the interests
of the corporations’ shareholders, from a short-term perspective.  Tax re-
form is a risky business, and some companies that now enjoy low effective
rates will risk seeing those rates increased.  Therefore, there may well be
an incentive to try to forestall the entire process of tax reform.  This incen-
tive imparts to the tax system its own internally generated tendency toward
stasis, in addition to the stasis produced by the broad political logjam that
we face today.
In the long and even intermediate terms, though, retention of our tax
regime, without fundamental and comprehensive reform, is a recipe for
growing economic and even social harm that will hurt everyone.  I am not
suggesting that those who represent corporate interests refrain from advo-
cating the perceived financial interests of shareholders.  But the advocacy
of shareholder interests needs to be leavened by a recognition that the
well-being of those shareholders depends on the country’s overall eco-
nomic and political well-being.
Now, there may be substantive arguments that our current interna-
tional tax system, with all its ramifications for the rest of the tax system, is
an optimal system, so that tax reform would be counterproductive per se.
In my own judgment, though, the defects in our current tax rules are glar-
ing, and the harm that those rules cause is serious.  I will even go so far as
to say, and I know some will disagree, that some attempts to defend the
status quo have become so strained, intellectually, as to have lost credibil-
ity.  I think it important that instead of falling into the trap of arguing for
stasis, corporate leadership instead devote its considerable energy and skill
toward promoting a re-designed tax system that will promote the country’s
economic and social well-being far better than the current system.
To sum up, the task of tax reform is, for the moment, stalled, and
once restarted it will face substantial obstacles.  I am confident, though,
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that those with expertise in tax policy in this country have the intellectual
and technical skills, the commitment to the country’s overall well-being,
and the impulse toward moderation and constructive interchange that will
be needed if viable reform plans are to be devised.  Much of the hard work
of designing a workable and centrist system can be begun now, so that
when the current polarization of the political system moderates, the ideas
needed to fashion a viable tax reform will be available.
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